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NOTES 
JURISDICTION-ATOMIC ENERGY-Federal Pre-emption 
and State Regulation of Radioactive Air Pollution: Who 
Is the Master of the Atomic Genie? 
Pending litigation between the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency and Northern States Power Company presents a potential 
federal-state conflict over the right of a state to impose upon opera-
tors of nuclear power plants more exacting pollution control stan-
dards than those required by regulations of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC).1 The AEC issued Northern States Power Com-
pany a permit to construct a nuclear power generating plant in 
Monticello, Minnesota.2 The regulations under which that permit 
was issued place a ceiling on the amount of radioactive effluents 
which can be discharged into the air during the course of the plant's 
operations.3 But under the regulations of the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, before the power company could begin operation of 
the plant, it was required to obtain a permit from that agency.4 The 
permit that it obtained from the state agency restricted the discharge 
of radioactive effluents from the plant to approximately two per 
cent of the levels allowed under the AEC standards. 5 Northern 
States Power Company complained that the state standards made 
economical operation of the plant impossible. The company has filed 
suit in federal district court, 6 asserting that the State of Minnesota 
is precluded from regulating radioactive pollution from atomic 
power plants because Congress has given the AEC exclusive author-
ity to regulate radiation hazards. 7 
Although conflict between federal and state regulation of radia-
tion hazards has existed for several years, 8 the suit in the federal 
1. Clemons, Pollution: Are Nuclear Reactors Safe?, Wall. St. J., Aug. 28, 1969, at 
6, col. 4. 
2. 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. 1[ 11,264 (1967). 
3. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 20 (1969). 
4. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency promulgated these regulations under 
authority of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116 (1964) on the theory that radioactive pollution of 
the air is merely one form of air contamination within its regulatory control. Tele-
phone Interview with Robert Johnson, Counsel to the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency, May I, 1970. 
5. Kenworthy, Who Should Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, § E, 
at 2, col. 4. 
6. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 3-69-185 (D. Minn., filed Aug. 
26, 1969). 
7. Kenworthy, supra note 5. 
8. For example, in March 1961, the Pennsylvania Department of Health and Safety 
ordered a company to reduce the concentration of low-level radioactive wastes which 
the company was discharging into a river to 50% of the level permitted under its AEC 
[ 1294] 
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district court in Minnesota presents the first opportunity for an ad-
judication of the question whether the AEC is the exclusive regu-
lator of air pollution from atomic power operations. The stringent 
state regulations which have created the federal-state conflict in the 
Minnesota case grew out of the concern of environmentalists that 
AEC standards regulating radioactive discharges from nuclear pro-
duction and utilization facilities fail to afford adequate protection.9 
Environmentalists have persuaded several state legislatures to enact 
pollution standards which include provisions regulating radioactive 
pollutants discharged by atomic activities conducted within their 
states.10 As concern for the environment grows, and as the atomic 
energy industry expands,11 resolution of the question whether the 
state or the federal government shall regulate pollution caused by 
that industry becomes increasingly important. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL .ANALYSIS 
OF THE PRE-EMPTION QUESTION 
There can be no doubt that Congress possesses the constitutional 
authority to enact the basic statutory framework for the regulation 
of atomic energy;12 nor is there any doubt that Congress could have 
license. Litigation was avoided, however, because the company decided to comply with 
the state order. Estep &: Adelman, State Control of Radiation: An Intergovernmental 
Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. R.Ev. 41, 43 (1961). In 1962, Consolidated Edison Com-
pany of New York withdrew an application to build a nuclear reactor in New York 
City, when it was faced with a vote by the city council on a bill to prohibit construc-
tion of nuclear reactors within the city limits. Helman, Preemption: Approaching 
Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 43, 44 
(1967). In Doswell v. City of Long Beach, l CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,f 4045 (Cal. 
Super. March 21, 1960), the superior court held that the city would not revoke plain-
tiff's permit to engage in the business of radioactive-waste disposal simply because the 
city health department had withdrawn its approval. In a sweeping statement, the court 
concluded that the Atomic Energy Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964)] covered the entire 
field of atomic-energy legislation, CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,f 4045, at 9113. 
9. Clemons, supra note I. See also Wicker, In the Nation: Taking on a Nuclear 
Giant, N.Y. Times, March I, 1970, at 17, col. 4. 
10. CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CODE §§ 25600-10 (West 1967). See also ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 36-771 to -790 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-501 to -530 (Supp. 1969) 
(water pollution). 
11. At the present time, less than 1 % of the nation's electrical energy is produced 
by nuclear installations. Dy 1980, however, nuclear power will generate approximately 
25% of the country's electrical energy. Tape, Environmental Aspects of Operation of 
Central Power Plants 3 (remarks at dinner meeting of the Washington Section of the 
American Nuclear Society, Dec. 11, 1968). 
12. In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964), Con-
gress relied upon its constitutionally granted powers of defense, proprietorship, and 
commerce to justify its regulation of radiation hazards. Several writers have analyzed 
the permissibility of that reliance and have concluded that the three named powers 
provide a sufficient constitutional basis for the regulatory scheme promulgated by the 
AEC. That conclusion appears to be sound. See, e.g., Estep &: Adelman, State Control 
of Radiation: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. R.Ev. 41, 44-50 
(1961). 
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pre-empted the field had it so chosen. In United States v. Darby,13 
the United States Supreme Court held that when a court is faced 
with a pre-emption issue involving a power which the Constitution 
has del~gated to Congress, the question to be answered is not 
whether Congress can pre-empt state legislation, but rather, whether 
Congress has pre-empted it.14 A review of the cases discussing the 
pre-emption of state law by federal legislation which deals with the 
same subject matter reveals that in formulating tests for resolving 
the issue, the Supreme Court has used a variety of expressions.ii:; 
Despite the diversity of expressions, however, it is clear that the 
Court uses the same basic analytical approach in all cases involving 
the question of pre-emption. Under this approach, the Court first 
examines the provisions of the respective federal and state laws to 
determine whether they conflict to such an extent that both laws 
cannot be enforced "without impairing federal superintendence of 
the field."16 If no such conflict exists, the Court then determines 
whether a finding of pre-emption is required either because the 
subject matter of the legislation involves dominant national interests 
which demand uniform regulation or because Congress has mani-
fested an intent to preclude concurrent state legislation.17 
The cases reveal that the Court's willingness to tolerate concur-
rent state legislation in any particular case depends largely upon the 
subject matter involved. For example, when the federal legislation 
deals with economic matters,18 individual rights and freedoms,10 or 
a field in which the national interest is clearly dominant,20 conflict-
ing state legislation is usually held invalid if it "stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress."21 Moreover, in such cases, the Court tends 
13. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
14. 312 U.S. at 124. 
15. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941): 
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or 
federal laws ... has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary 
to; occupying the field; repugnance; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; 
curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible 
constitutional test or . . . yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one 
crystal, distinctly marked formula. 
16. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 
17. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963). 
18. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1967). 
19. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 
(1941). 
20. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (labor 
relations); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (seditious activities against the 
national government); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (immigration and 
naturalization). 
21. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941); cf. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 
533 (1912). 
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to base its finding of pre-emption on relatively slender evidence of 
congressional intent.22 The application of these standards results in 
the invalidation of any state law that is inconsistent with the general 
scheme of the federal legislation. Similarly, when the subject matter 
of the legislation demands national uniformity of regulation, state 
law is usually pre-empted on the ground that federal legislation has 
completely occupied the field.23 
On the other hand, in cases in which the state law that allegedly 
has been displaced by federal legislation involves an area of long-
recognized state interests-particularly public health and safety-
the Court has been more tolerant of concurrent state legislation.24 
In such cases, the Court has generally required a repugnance or an 
actual conflict between the substantive provisions of the respective 
federal and state laws before it has concluded that the state law had 
been pre-empted.25 Moreover, in such cases, the Court has required 
more persuasive evidence of congressional intent to preclude state 
legislation26 than it has in cases in which long-standing state interests 
have not been present. Finally, when strong state interests have been 
present, the Court has seemed relatively indulgent of state regulation 
and it has frequently upheld such state laws, particularly if those 
laws have operated mainly to fill the gaps in federal legislation.27 
As an initial matter, then, it must be determined which of the 
22. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) Gustice Black, dissenting). See 
also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947): "[T]he act of Congress 
may 'touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system 
[must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' " 
23. Although the requirement of uniformity is a sufficient independent constitutional 
basis for such a decision [Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851)], 
the Court occasionally prefers to decide these cases on the ground of federal pre-
emption. See, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Pennsylvania 
R.R. v. Public Serv. Commn., 250 U.S. 566 (1919). See generally Note, Pre-emption as a 
Preferential Ground-A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959). 
24. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida 
Lime &: Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In the latter case, for 
example, the Court noted: "Vvhile it is conceded that the California statute is not a 
health measure, neither logic nor precedent invites any distinction between state 
regulation designed to keep unhealthful or unsafe commodities off the grocer's shelves 
and those designed to prevent deception of consumers.'' 373 U.S. at 146. See also 
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (Chief Justice Stone, dissenting); 
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); note 27 infra. 
25. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), illustrates the test used in such cases: 
"The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the state of its police 
powers, which would be valid if not superceded by federal action, is superceded only 
where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 
be reconciled or consistently stand together." 302 U.S. at IO. 
26. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 432 (1963); 
Florida Lime&: Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963). 
27. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Welch v. 
New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 72 (1939); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Mintz v. 
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 87 (1933); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 507 (1911). 
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foregoing categories of pre-emption cases the controversies involving 
the regulation of radioactive air pollution most closely resemble. It 
can be argued with some force that such disputes fall within that 
category of cases in which there are dominant national interests or 
a need for uniform national regulation. That argument is supported 
by the fact that the federal government has exercised broad author-
ity over atomic energy since the early development of the field by 
governmental scientists working on the Manhattan Engineering 
Project.28 Moreover, atomic energy has been the subject of extensive 
federal legislation-the Atomic Energy Act29-and is regulated by a 
special federal agency-the AEC.3° Furthermore, it can be argued 
that the development of nuclear power is a vital national interest 
which is more adequately served through federal, rather than state, 
regulation. But the state regulation which is the subject of contro-
versies such as that in Minnesota is not concerned with atomic 
power as such. Rather, the state regulation is directed toward air 
pollution from atomic power facilities; pollution control, unlike 
atomic-energy development, is an area of long-standing state interest 
and responsibility. That responsibility has been recognized both by 
the Supreme Court31 and by Congress.32 The disputes in question 
thus fall between the two lines of pre-emption cases, and it is at 
least arguable that the national interest in promoting the develop-
ment of atomic energy is not dominant when it is compared with 
the interests which the states have in protecting the health and 
safety of their citizens through preventing radioactive pollution of 
the local environment. If a court rejects that argument, however, it 
will have little difficulty in deciding that state regulation is pre-
empted either on the ground that such regulation conflicts with the 
objectives of the federal regulatory scheme-to protect the public 
health without restraining industrial development by imposing un-
necessarily strict safety standards33-or on the ground that federal 
legislation was intended to occupy the field fully.34 Moreover, even 
if a court finds that the national interests are not dominant, it is 
28. Esgain, State Authority and Responsibility in the Atomic Energy Field, 1962 
DUKE L.J. 163, 163-65. 
29. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2011-296 (1964). 
30. 42 u.s.c. § 2031 (1964). 
31. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
32. Air Quality Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); cf. Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1964); AEC, Criteria for Guidance of States and the AEC in 
the Discontinuance of AEC Regulatory Authority over By-Product, Source, and Special 
Nuclear Materials in Quantities Not Sufficient To Form a Critical Mass and the As-
sumption Thereof by States Through Agreement, Criterion One, in 4 CCH ATOMIC 
ENERGY L. REP. 11 16,537 (1967). 
34. See notes 20, 23 supra and accompanying text. 
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still not clear that state regulation can be upheld under the more 
indulgent standards expressed in the second category of cases.35 
In pursuing this inquiry, the court must determine whether the 
state, by enacting exacting standards relating to radioactive pollu-
tion of the air, is supplementing or frustrating the provisions and 
purposes of the Atomic Energy Act. The fact that the state regula-
tions are designed to eliminate the same environmental evil to 
which federal regulations are directed is not sufficient for a finding 
of pre-emption, for the Supreme Court has held that concurrence of 
regulation is not by itself a sufficient ground for declaring that a 
state standard has been pre-empted.36 Indeed, the Court has indi-
cated in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul31 that 
even state regulations which are more stringent than federal regula-
tions may supplement federal legislation without conflicting ·with 
it. That case involved a California law which barred immature 
avocados from the California markets. The California statute defined 
immature avocados as those having an oil content of less than eight 
per cent while the federal marketing standards defined maturity on 
the basis of size, weight, and picking date.38 Florida Lime and Avo-
cado Growers, Inc., asserted that the existence of the federal stan-
dards precluded the enforcement of the California law, which op-
erated to exclude from the California markets approximately six 
per cent of the avocados which met the federal standard. In uphold-
ing the California regulation, the Court utilized the following 
standard for determining whether the federal and state laws were in 
direct conflict: 
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and re-
quires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one 
engaged in interstate commerce.39 
The Court then recited the district court's finding that Florida 
avocados were capable of complying with the most exacting Cali-
35. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra. 
36. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (upholding the validity of a state 
statute which prohibited the same activity prohibited under the Federal Motor Carrier 
Act). It may be argued that the Court retreated from its position in Zook when it 
decided Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961) (holding that the Tobacco 
Inspection Act fully occupied the field of tobacco inspection and classification). In 
Campbell, however, the Court found a congressional intent to pre-empt concurrent 
state regulation before it declared that supplemental state regulation was as suscep-
tible to this pre-emption as was state regulation which conflicts with the federal 
scheme. 368 U.S. at 302. 
37. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
38. 373 U.S. at 139. 
39. 373 U.S. at 142-43 (emphasis added). 
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fornia maturity test and that they had done so in the past, and it 
concluded that there was therefore no direct conflict.40 
However, the Court's test in Lime and Avocado Growers should 
not be relied upon too heavily. If taken literally, that test would 
mean that a direct conflict between state and federal standards 
would never exist so long as compliance with the most exacting regu-
lation, whether federal or state, would necessarily include compli-
ance with the less exacting regulation. So viewed, the test seems 
overly broad. More realistically, the test should be viewed simply as 
an illustration that in cases involving state health and safety mea-
sures, the Court requires a high degree of conflict between state and 
federal laws before it will declare that state law has been pre-empted 
by federal legislation. Moreover, the case clearly does suggest that if 
the state's health and safety standards are more exacting than those 
in federal regulations, the Court may be more willing to tolerate 
concurrent state regulation than it is when the state standards are 
more permissive than the federal standards.41 
The foregoing discussion of the conflicts tests which have been 
articulated by the Supreme Court suggests that there is no direct 
conflict between state and federal regulations concerning air pollu-
tion from atomic sources. Consequently, resolution of the pre-
emption question must turn upon an examination of congressional 
intent. At one time the Court seemed to indicate that an intent to 
pre-empt was to be presumed from the mere enactment of federal 
legislation upon a subject.42 Subsequent decisions, however, indicate 
that the Court no longer adheres to this position. In California v. 
Zook,43 the Court held that the mere coincidence of regulation, with-
out evidence of a congressional intent to exclude the state regula-
tion, is only one factor to be considered in an inquiry into.congres-
sional intent.44 In determining such intent, the Court seems to rely 
both upon direct evidence and upon inferences drawn from its in-
quiries into the historical background and legislative history of the 
particular federal statute in question. In addition, the Court seeks 
40. 373 U.S. at 143. 
41. The four dissenting justices in Lime and Avocado Growers interpreted the 
majority opinion to stand for this proposition. After concluding that federal and state 
standards did not conflict, the Court analyzed the provisions of the Act, their legisla-
tive history, and their operation, and determined that Congress did not manifest an 
unambiguous intent to preclude state regulation. 
42. See Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914). In that case, a New York law 
prescribing an eight-hour work day for railroad telegraph operators was held to be 
pre-empted by a federal statute prescribing a nine-hour work period for nighttime 
operators and a thirteen-hour work period for daytime operators. 
43. 336 U.S. 725 (1949). 
44. 336 U.S. at 730. 
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to determine legislative intent through an examination of the statute 
itself and of its administration by the designated federal agency.45 
Since there is apparently no direct conflict between the state and 
federal regulations in the present controversy, judicial determination 
of congressional intent is necessary. The discussion which follows 
seeks to examine the legislative history and implementation of the 
1954 Atomic Energy Act, 46 in order to determine whether, under the 
foregoing approach, a court is likely to find that there was a congres-
sional intent sufficient to preclude state legislation concerning pol-
lution from atomic power facilities. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 
The purpose of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was to encourage 
the private development and utilization of atomic energy.47 As 
private industries began to operate nuclear facilities, legislatures of 
states in which such facilities were operated became concerned about 
increased radiation hazards, and they enacted laws to regulate atomic 
activities conducted within their states under AEC licenses.48 Be-
cause the 1954 Act contained no express statement concerning 
pre-emption, the need for a clarification of state and federal responsi-
bilities in the regulation of the nuclear industry became increasingly 
evident. In 1959 Congress sought to provide that clarification by 
enacting section 274 of the 1959 amendments to the Act.49 
Section 274(b) of those amendments authorized the AEC to enter 
into a "turnover" agreement with the governor of any state for the 
discontinuance of AEC regulation of certain specified materials: (I) 
by-product materials, (2) source materials, and (3) special nuclear 
materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. 50 But 
45. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 432 (1963). 
46. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2011-296 (1964). 
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2013(d) (1964). 
48. See generally E. STASON, s. EsTEP, & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAw 952-1001 
(1959). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964). See Estep & Adelman, supra note 12, at 58-60. 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1964). Twenty-two states have entered into turnover agree-
ments with the AEC: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Washington. Although New York has entered into a turnover agreement with the 
AEC, it has not conceded exclusive AEC jurisdiction. Memorandum of Understanding 
art. 5, in 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,i 16,563 (1967). States which have entered 
into turnover agreements with the AEC exercise exclusive control over the specified 
materials; but before entering into an agreement authorized by § 274(b), the AEC 
must find that the state regulatory program is compatible with the federal program 
and is adequate to protect public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(d)(2) (1964). To 
guide the states in formulating their regulatory programs, the AEC has published 
criteria to be used in evaluating these programs. These criteria require that federal 
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section 27 4(b) is limited in scope to these materials and provides for 
the relinquishment of AEC authority only in these areas. More rele-
vant to the issue of air pollution from atomic facilities is section 
274(c): 
No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) shall provide 
for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain 
authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of-
(1) the construction and operation of any production facility.51 
According to interpretations by the AEC, the agency's responsibili-
ties under this subsection include the control of radioactive dis-
charges into the air. 52 
Admittedly, one could argue that these two sections, read to-
gether, indicate a congressional design to delegate to the AEC the 
power of exclusive control of radiation hazards, although the AEC 
could, if it so chose, delegate some of that power to the states. In 
light of the historical background of the amendment, this interpre-
tation of congressional purpose appears to be reasonable. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that section 274(c) precludes the AEC 
merely from entering into those agreements with the states under 
which the states would have exclusive responsibility for regulating 
radioactive pollution of the air, and that the section does not on its 
face preclude stringent state standards which are designed to supple-
ment, rather than to replace, minimum federal standards established 
by the AEC.53 Because an intent to preclude state regulation of pol-
and state standards for radiation protection be uniform. AEC, Criteria for Guidance 
of States and the AEC in the Discontinuance of AEC Regulatory Authority over By-
Product Source and Special Nuclear Materials in Quantities Not Sufficient To Form a 
Critical Mass and the Assumption Thereof by States Through Agreement, Criterion 3, 
in 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. ,i 16,537 (1967). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(c)(l) (1964). 
52. Control of radioactive effiuents is considered an integral part of the design, 
construction, and operation of nuclear-production facilities. See Hearings on Federal-
State Relations Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306 
(1959) [testimony of Robert Lowenstein, Office of the General Counsel, AEC, explain-
ing § 274(c)] [hereinafter 1959 Hearings]. 
53. Lime and Avocado Growers indicates that the Court is unlikely to hold state 
regulation pre-empted when state standards merely supplement federal standards. St:e 
text accompanying notes 37-41 supra. In its analysis of congressional intent, the Court, 
in Lime and Avocado Growers, emphasized that the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
authorized the Secretary to set minimum standards. The dissent dismissed the ma-
jority's reliance upon this language in the federal law: 
It is a commonplace that when the appropriate federal regulating agency adopts 
minimum standards which on balance satisfy the needs of the subject matter 
without a disproportionate burden on the regulatees, the balance struck is not 
to be upset by the imposition of higher local standards. • • • And when the 
cumulative operation of more strict local law is to be continued • • • Congress 
has so provided in express terms. 
373 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). Lime and Avocado Growers graphically illustrates 
that different pre-emption standards are applied by the Court according to the 
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lution in this area is not clearly evident in the statutory language, 
an analysis of the legislative history of section 274(c) is necessary in 
order to glean additional indications of congressional intent. 
During the hearings on the amendment held by the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, the lack of an explicit delineation of 
federal and state responsibilities regarding the operation of nuclear 
reactors was discussed. In fact, the same Minnesota regulations54 that 
are the subject of the current controversy between that state and the 
AEC led Mr. Toll, counsel to the committee, to suggest the need for 
further clarification: 
Mr. Toll. . .. [O]n the question of reactors does this bill go far 
enough? Should there be a statement that these activities are ex-
pressly preemptive to the federal government? 
Mr. Lowenstein. [Office of the General Counsel, AEC] Under this bill 
which gives explicit reference to the interest of the Federal and State 
Governments, we think it would be fairly apparent, as many of us 
now believe under the existing Atomic Energy Act, that there has 
been an area of preemption. We considered the desirability of writ-
ing the kind of provision you suggested, Mr. Toll, and we decided 
against it, primarily for the reason that it is practically impossible to 
try to define, taking into account all of the various gray areas and 
special circumstances that might arise, where these areas of preemp-
tion begin and end. 
Mr. Toll. Does this bill do anything to clarify the situation as to 
the Minnesota regulations ... ? Minnesota has no indication from 
the Federal Government as to whether or not the State of Minnesota 
has legal authority to license reactors. 
Mr. Lowenstein. In this bill, we are not trying to deal with any 
specific situation. 
Mr. Toll. Minnesota is just an example of the first State that has 
attempted to license reactors. Should this bill attempt to spell out 
whether or not they are encouraged or whether they have legal 
authority to do this? 
Mr. Lowenstein. I think this is a suggestion that is certainly worth 
giving consideration to. The problem, I think, that you run into is 
that when you begin to specify one thing such as licensing, then 
you create questions and perhaps leave inferences as to what the 
State's authority might be in other details.55 
Mr. Toll then suggested that the Act should be reworded in order 
various characterizations of the interests involved; the majority viewed the case as 
involving a health and safety measure, whereas the dissent looked upon the California 
statute as an economic measure. 
54. See note 2 supra. 
55. 1959 Hearings 307. 
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to make explicit Congress' intent to pre-empt state control of nu-
clear reactors; but Mr. Lowenstein, expressing the AEC position, 
stated a preference for leaving the question to the courts: 
Mr. Lowenstein. We thought that this act, without saying in so many 
words did make clear that there was preemption here, but we have 
tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption, feeling 
that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions perhaps up 
to the courts later to be resolved.56 
Representative Durham voiced some objection to the AEC position: 
Representative Durham. I don't agree in writing an act like that. 
I think it should be clearly defined what is our field and what is 
their field. 
Mr. Lowenstein. I think this does do that, Mr. Durham. 
Representative Durham. I think so, too. If they want to set up a 
licensing system, they can do it. The courts will decide it, then, not 
us. I think the law should be as clear as possible to avoid litigation. 
I am not a lawyer, but I wonder if that is not a pretty clear state-
ment of what we intended to do, and what we are writing into the 
act.57 
Some additional suggestion of the congressional intent with re-
spect to pre-emption may be seen in the Senate report which ac-
companied the bill. That report contained two statements referring 
to the exclusive authority of the AEC. One statement, found in the 
Comments by the Joint Committee, is a specific reference to section 
274(b) and thus may not be applicable to section 274(c), which is 
the provision that is more relevant to control of radioactive air pol-
lution. 58 The other statement is more general and is included in 
the Committee's analysis of subsection (k), which provides: "Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of a state 
or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protec-
tion against radiation hazards."59 The Committee's statement ex-
plained that provision as follows: 
This subsection [(k)] is intended to make it clear that the bill does not 
impair the state authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for 
manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation 
protection. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has exclusive 
authority to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 307-08. Representative Carl T. Durham was Chairman of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. 
58. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2879 (1959). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 202I(k) (1964). 
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such time as the state enters into an agreement with the Commission 
to assume such responsibility.6° 
Since the statute's only reference to "agreements" is that contained 
in section 274(b), it appears that the "agreements" to which the com-
mittee refers must be those contemplated by subsection (b). And be-
cause subsection (b) refers to agreements only with respect to source, 
by-product, and special nuclear materials, it is at least arguable that 
subsection (k.)'s apparent preclusion of state regulation refers only to 
regulation of those specific areas and does not preclude state regula-
tion of radioactive air pollution.61 
The legislative history of section 274(c) does reveal that Congress 
intended to pre-empt state regulation of nuclear reactors, but the 
precise extent of that intended pre-emption is not certain. In fact, 
the AEC successfully argued against rewording the statute to provide 
that the Commission would have exclusive authority to regulate 
nuclear reactors; the AEC, in this particular instance, preferred the 
flexibility afforded by a less precise delineation of the bounds of 
federal pre-emption.62 Admittedly, some members of the Committee 
believed that section 274(c) in its original form, which was subse-
quently enacted into law with the passage of the amendments, was 
sufficient to indicate a congressional intent to pre-empt all state 
regulation of nuclear reactors. But the actual wording of the provi-
sion may afford the court some flexibility in interpreting it. It would 
arguably not be inconsistent with federal regulation of the construc-
tion and operation of reactors for a state to determine, within the 
limits of technological feasibility, what amount of discharge of 
atomic effluents is tolerable, and to refuse to permit the operation 
of a nuclear reactor within its borders unless that standard is met. 
The specific design and operational aspects of the atomic power in-
stallation would be left to the AEC. 
Of course, after analyzing the provisions of the statute, their 
legislative history, and the historical background of the amendments 
to the act, a court could reasonably conclude that Congress intended 
60. U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2882-83 (1959). 
61. That contention finds support in the legislative history of subsection (k). As that 
subsection was originally drafted, its preclusion of state regulation was explicitly 
directed to those categories contained in § 274(b): 
It is the intention of this Act that State laws and regulations conceming the 
control of radiation hazards from by-product, source, and special nuclear materials 
shall not be applicable except pursuant to an agreement entered into with the 
Commission pursuant to subsection (b): Provided, however, that States may adopt 
registration requirements for such materials and may inspect the use of such 
materials within States to assure compliance with the Commission's regulations. 
1959 Hearings 489. 
62. See testimony of Mr. Robert Lowenstein in text accompanying notes 55-57 
supra. 
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federal legislation fully to occupy the field of radiation-hazard regu-
lation, and that concurrent state regulation is therefore precluded. 
But the legislative history does not clearly mandate that conclusion. 
Indeed, there is some indication of an express intent to leave the 
courts substantial room for interpretation. 63 Interpretative factors in 
judicial resolution of questions of federal pre-emption are malleable 
and may sometimes be shaped by the policies surrounding a particu-
lar issue.64 Thus it seems that if a court can be persuaded that the 
local interests in protecting the environment from unnecessary ra-
dioactive pollution not only are not subordinate to, but are sig-
nificantly greater than, the federal interest in promoting the devel-
opment of economical nuclear power, then the court might conclude 
that Congress has not manifested an unambiguous intent to displace 
state regulation of radioactive pollution of the air. 65 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A description of the AEC's procedure for licensing nuclear re-
actors under the Atomic Energy Act provides valuable insights 
necessary to a comprehension of the policy considerations which 
could bear upon judicial resolution of the pre-emption question. 
The AEC's licensing procedure may be broadly analyzed as a two-
step process. 66 The prospective licensee first files with the AEC an 
application for an operating license.67 The application must contain 
detailed information sufficient to enable the AEC's regulatory staff 
to determine whether the applicant has made adequate provisions 
for the protection of public health and safety. 68 The Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)69 makes a similar but inde-
pendent review of the safety features of the reactor. The regula-
63. See testimony of l\:Ir. Robert Lowenstein in text accompanying note 57 supra. 
64. See generally text accompanying notes 16-27 supra. 
65. Compare opinion of the Court in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1941), with 
dissenting opinion of Justice Burton, 336 U.S. at 741. 
66. See generally Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A 
Critical View, 43 NOTRE DAME I.Aw. 633, 635-43 (1968). 
67. The AEC has a statutory duty to give prompt notice of the filing of a license 
application to the state in which the proposed activities will be conducted. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021(1) (1964). The AEC rules of practice require that copies of the application be 
sent to the chief executive officer of the state and to the appropriate local subdivision. 
10 C.F.R. § 2.lOl(b) (1969). 
68. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a) (1969). 
69. The ACRS, an advisory committee of scientists and engineers, is a statutory 
creation of Congress [42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1969)] and provides an independent evaluation 
of the safety aspects of the AEC license proceedings. Members of the committee are not 
employees of the AEC, but serve as independent consultants, and are selected by the 
AEC from nominations made by the existing committee and the Director of Regula-
tion. Hearings on Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power Before the Joint 
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1969) (testimony of Commissioner 
Ranc:!y, AEC) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings]. 
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tory staff and the ACRS both write reports, which are submitted to 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.70 The Board then holds 
a hearing to determine whether a provisional construction permit 
will be issued.71 In actual practice, the regulatory staff and the ACRS 
do not issue their reports until the applicant has complied with their 
safety requirements.72 Thus the proceedings are usually uncon-
tested and pro forma, and consist mostly of introducing testimony in 
support of the reports of the regulatory staff and the ACRS. States 
do have the opportunity to intervene,73 however, and may introduce 
testimony and evidence to contest the safety determinations of the 
regulatory staff and the ACRS.74 Upon completion of construction 
in accordance with the application, the applicant then, as the second 
stage in the licensing procedure, amends his application by including 
a final safety analysis. If the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
then finds that the operation of the facility will not endanger public 
health and safety, an operating permit is issued.75 
The AEC licensing procedure outlined above is characterized 
by a series of complex questions which demand that highly trained 
scientists, technicians, and engineers administer the procedure. For 
this reason, it is clear that a complete licensing program is beyond 
the financial capability of most state governments. The federal 
government, because of its superior financial resources, is more 
likely to attract qualified personnel than are the states. Accordingly, 
70. The ACRS report becomes part of the record of the application and a copy is 
sent to the appropriate state official. IO C.F.R. § 2.102(c) (1969). 
71. The AEC regulations were amended in 1966 to permit the construction of the 
reactor to proceed simultaneously with research and development of the safety features. 
10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1969). The applicant must submit the proposed design for the 
facility, identify the safety features or components requiring further research, and 
specify that a research and development program will be conducted in order to resolve 
any safety questions before the latest completion date designated in the application. 
Upon a finding that the proposed facility can operate without undue risk to the 
public, a provisional construction permit will be issued. 10 C.F.R. § 2.l04(b)(l) (1969). 
72. Green, supra note 66, at 642. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 202l(i) (1964). Although Minnesota officials did not intervene in the 
proceeding, they did make a limited appearance, without taking a position on the 
issue, in order to introduce evidence, interrogate witnesses, and advise the Commission 
as provided for in 10 C.F.R. § 2.715 (1969). 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. 1J 11,264 
(1967). 
74. It has been argued that this procedure is not satisfactory, because the inter• 
venor bas the burden of proving the inadequacy of the safety precautions provided in 
the application. See Green, supra note 66, at 655. 
75. 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(e) (1969); 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1964) provides that no license may 
be issued when the public health and safety would thereby be jeopardized. Although 
an operating license may be granted without a hearing, the Commission is required to 
give thirty-days notice of its intention to do so, and must bold a hearing if one is 
requested by a party whose interests will be affected by the issuance of the license. 
42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1964). A public bearing on the application of Northern States 
Power Company for an operating license was scheduled for April 28, 1970. Report 
Letter No. 769, 4 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY I.Aw REP. (March 13, 1970). 
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advocates of federal control argue that the states cannot act effec-
tively in this area.76 This argument, however, is not conclusive. 
States do recognize the limitations on their ability to administer a 
comprehensive program, and consequently they tend to concentrate 
their efforts on specific problem areas.77 By concentrating their re-
sources on the specific area of air pollution, for example, the states 
may well be able to attract radiological-health experts who are as 
qualified in that particular area as are those employed by the federal 
government. 78 Moreover, many such persons can be found on the 
campuses of state universities and colleges and may therefore be 
available to the states as consultants.79 
A further argument advanced in favor of exclusive federal con-
trol is the contention of the nuclear-energy industry that it finds 
greater reassurance in the AEC's comprehensive program than in 
disjointed state schemes, because the federal regulator has an appre-
ciation of the over-all problems associated with the regulation of 
the industry.80 Although this argument has a certain persuasiveness, 
it also has weaknesses. It may be questioned, first of all, whether it 
is desirable to preclude state regulation simply because the industry 
would prefer to be regulated only by the federal agency with which 
it is familiar. The tendency of regulatory agencies to be "captured" 
76. See, e.g., Helman, Preemption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict over Licens-
ing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 63-66 (1967). 
77. Id. 
78. Indeed, the standards contained in the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
permit were recommended by Dr. Ernest C. Tsivoglou, Professor of Sanitary Engi-
neering at the Georgia Institute of Technology and former head of radiological water 
pollution control for the United States Public Health Service, who is serving as a 
consultant to the Pollution Control Agency. Clemons, supra note I. 
79. Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple, Professor of Radiological Health, School of Public 
Health, University of Michigan, stated in an interview that, in his opinion, a suffi-
cient number of radiological-health experts would be available to furnish the re-
quired personnel to the states if state regulation is upheld. Faculty members of state 
universities which have radiological-health programs are generally available to state 
agencies for consultation; and although, according to Dr. Whipple, state agencies 
traditionally prefer full-time staffs to part-time consultants, the greater cost of a full-
time staff would tend to limit the demand for full-time employees. Another factor 
which indicates that sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel would be 
available is that the supply of persons trained in radiological health expands with 
each class that graduates from the radiological-health programs now established in 
colleges and universities. Some of those graduates work for state health departments; 
others are employed by the AEC; and still others are hired by the public-utility com-
panies. In addition, Dr. Whipple noted that some graduates are forming consulting 
firms-a practice which he expects will expand with the growth of the nuclear in-
dustry. Dr. Whipple conceded that an acute shortage would be created if all states 
made the necessary appropriations and attempted to hire trained personnel within 
a short time, but he suggested that this would be unlikely. Interview with Dr. G. 
Hoyt Whipple, Professor of Radiological Health, School of Public Health, University 
of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 13, 1970. 
SO. See Helman1 supra note ?61 a~ 63-6¾, 
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by those whom they regulate is well-known,81 and that consideration 
alone should prompt a cautious approach in an area as delicate as 
that involving atomic energy. Indeed, there is some indication that 
the AEC has become identified with the industry which it is regulat-
ing and that the Commission does more promoting than regulating. 
Practice under the licensing program reveals that the determinations 
to issue permits are sometimes made, prior to public hearings, in 
nonpublic meetings between the AEC regulatory staff and the ap-
plicant. 82 The burden is on the intervenor to prove that the provi-
sions of the application are inadequate to protect the public safety.83 
The primary functions of the AEC's counsel in public hearings are 
to demonstrate that the radioactive discharges are within the mini-
mum levels required by the regulatory staff and to publicize safety 
measures provided in the reactor design-or, as one commentator 
has stated, "to help the applicant get a construction permit."84 
Moreover, the industry's objection to state regulation seems to 
presume that the state regulators will be incompetent and parochial 
-a presumption that may not be warranted. It may be expected that 
in a state licensing proceeding the applicant will at least have an op-
portunity to present evidence to demonstrate to the state agency 
that the agency's standards or regulations are unreasonable in light 
of their consequences on related aspects of operating a nuclear 
power plant. Thus, the state regulators' attention will be focused 
on the precise difficulties which the state standards create for the 
power company; and the state agency will be able to evaluate the 
reasonableness of its standards in view of those consequences. More-
over, there will be available to the industry a degree of judicial 
protection, particularly if the decisions of the state administrative 
body run counter to the federal regulations. In any event, it seems a 
bit early to dismiss the possibility of adequate state regulation; one 
must posit at least a modicum of confidence in the capacity of state 
agencies to render reasonable decisions. 
Another objection to state regulation may be drawn from the 
nature of air pollution. It may be contended that because air pol-
lution from atomic facilities is an interstate problem, national regu-
lation is necessary. That objection is persuasive, however, only to 
the extent that pollution from one state may harm inhabitants of 
another state. Certainly, federal regulation is necessary to ensure 
that lax standards of one state do not result in harm to persons in 
another state. But when one state seeks to set pollution control 
standards which are more strict than those of a neighboring state or 
81. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 11-14 (1965). 
82. See Green, supra note 66, at 651. 
83. Id. at 654. 
84. Id. at 656. 
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the federal government, no harm to persons in the neighboring state 
can result, and hence there is no need for pre-emption by federal 
regulation. This reasoning applies to radioactive air pollution, for 
strict state standards in fact serve to protect inhabitants of neighbor-
ing states; and, in any event, so long as state standards may not be 
more lax than the federal standards, any pollution reaching adjoin-
ing states will not exceed that permitted by the federal standards. 
Another important policy consideration is the need for economi-
cal electrical power. Admittedly, the addition of state licensing sys-
tems would create an additional expense in an already costly pro-
cess. 85 In addition, the AEC argues that it is in the best position to 
strike the balance between public safety and the economical develop-
ment of nuclear power, since a state agency, concerned only with 
safety considerations, may not give adequate attention to the need 
to take tolerable risks in order to further the development of peace-
ful uses of atomic energy. 86 That argument, however, should be 
examined with some skepticism in view of the allegations that the 
AEC may have become a "captured" agency.87 In any event, the ar-
gument that allowing state regulation will increase the cost of elec-
trical power generated by nuclear energy is persuasive only up to a 
point. In the first place, it is not clear that the implementation of 
the state standards would retard the development of atomic power 
production or significantly increase the cost of electrical power. In-
deed, it might be argued that imposition of strict standards can 
serve to encourage increased technological development in order to 
produce electrical power more efficiently. Moreover, since utility 
rates are in part based on a fixed rate of return on investment,88 
capital expenditures necessitated by pollution control regulations 
could be spread among a large consumer population and thus 
neither directly impede technological advance nor substantially in-
crease the cost of electrical power. In the Minnesota situation, for 
example, the state pollution control agency determined that the in-
creased costs necessitated by its regulation of radioactive discharges 
from the utility's nuclear power plant would not increase the price 
of electricity beyond a level which consumers would be willing to 
85. See generally Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 
50 KY. L. REv. 29, 34-36 (1959). 
86. Green, supra note 66, at 649. 
87. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra. 
88. A fair rate of return is the generally accepted measure of reasonable rate levels 
for privately owned public utilities who enjoy monopoly status. The role of return 
allowed is a multiple of two factors: the rate base and the fair rate of return. The 
rate base is the total amount of invested capital on which the utility is permitted in 
reasonable rate of compensation. The fair rate of return is a percentage rate deemed 
appropriate in light of historical conditions and considerations prevailing or antici-
pated at the time of the rate case. J. 130NBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 
147-51 (1961). See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
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pay,89 presumably because the cost would be spread among all con-
sumers so that none would feel a substantial burden individually.90 
It may be argued that a national agency is the appropriate au-
thority to regulate atomic pollution, because the increased costs of 
production required by local regulation of radioactive pollutants 
will affect consumer prices beyond local markets. This objection, 
however, is not unique to atomic pollutants, but is equally applicable 
to all forms of air pollution. Yet, despite the fact that local control 
of pollution may affect consumer prices outside the regulating state, 
Congress, when it enacted the Air Quality Control Act of 1967,91 
emphasized local control of air pollution. It thus appears that the 
economic effects of state regulation in this area are not sufficient to 
preclude state regulation. 
Moreover, it can be contended that the economics of production 
should not be accorded great weight in determining the propriety of 
state efforts toward pollution control, for as many environmentalists 
have pointed out, the economics of production are in fact the funda-
mental cause of the general deterioration of the environment.92 Be-
cause past generations sacrificed the environment in their pursuit of 
economic and technological development, this generation faces an 
environmental crisis of staggering proportions. In view of that crisis, 
the public today is becoming increasingly aware of the value of the 
environment and thus may now be willing to pay to preserve that 
environment. 
The foregoing policy considerations suggest that arguments 
against permitting some state regulation in this area are not neces-
sarily compelling. Indeed, there are a number of policy considera-
tions which favor a degree of state regulation. For example, the 
indications that the AEC may tend to favor promotion over protec-
tion93 suggest that some state regulation or participation could serve 
89. Kenworthy, Who Will Police the Polluters?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, § E, at 2, 
col. 3. 
90. The impact that the increased cost of electricity would have on individual 
consumers of electricity might be further minimized because a substantial portion 
of the electricity produced would be purchased by industries which might socialize 
that increased cost among the consumers of their products. 
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
92. 1969 Hearings 297 (testimony of Mr. Carl Klein, Asst. Secretary for Water 
Quality Research, U.S. Dept. of the Interior): 
Clearly, we must not cast the question of balanced use of the environment in 
solely economic terms. 
Under these conditions, the use of the environment is taken at zero and, in-
evitably, we wind up sacrificing the environment for the benefit of development 
and resource expenditures. 
Alternative balances, such as those of competing uses in view of society's long-
range goals, must be considered. Man has existed some 2 million years on the 
basis of his use of the environment without reckoning the true cost of that use. 
Our future depends on a more reasonable assessment of its value. 
93. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra. 
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to promote balance in the decision-making process. In addition, 
strong state interests are present in this area. Local commumt1es 
bear the risk of having a nuclear power plant in their midst and 
hence have a very real interest in the level of radioactive discharges 
at which atomic power plants are permitted to operate. Yet under 
the present regulatory scheme, state authorities have no power to 
regulate the potential hazards from radioactive pollution of the air 
and have little effective opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process. The best solution seems to be to permit states such 
as Minnesota, which seek an additional margin of safety, to play a 
more active role in accommodating the need for electrical power 
with the need to preserve the environment. 
The goal could be achieved in either of two ways. One approach 
is through state regulation under existing law-the method sought 
by Minnesota in its current dispute. Success in this approach de-
pends upon a judicial finding that some state regulation of radio-
active air pollution has not been pre-empted by Congress. Although 
the statutory framework and its legislative history do not clearly 
preclude a sympathetic court from upholding the state regulation in 
this instance, the probable outcome admittedly must favor pre-
emption. In any event, there are limits to what could be ac-
complished through this approach. Certainly, a judicial decision 
permitting a degree of state regulation could have the effect of 
counterbalancing some of the shortcomings of the current AEC 
procedure. Yet many of the objections to state regulation have some 
validity, and permitting state efforts in this field raises the problem 
of unnecessary and wasteful duplication of administration. For that 
reason, it seems that a long-range solution would better be sought 
through congressional alteration of the statutory framework. 
The conditions upon which Congress predicated the present reg-
ulatory scheme when it amended the Atomic Energy Act in 1959 
need to be re-evaluated in light of the changes which have occurred 
in those conditions during the past ten years. The two most impor-
tant of these changes are the willingness on the part of state govern-
ments to assume greater responsibility in controlling environmental 
pollution and the increased number of trained personnel who are 
available to aid the states in their efforts to control radioactive air 
pollution. In addition, although the development of nuclear power 
to satisfy the nation's expanding needs for electrical energy con-
tinues to be an important national interest, that interest must now 
be harmonized with a correspondingly important need to preserve 
the environment. Thus, it is not possible to say that either the 
national interest in promoting nuclear development or the local 
interest in health and safety predominates; on the contrary, each is 
intertwined with the other. Hence, what is needed is a coordinated 
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regulatory scheme in which states could have a greater opportunity 
for participation than they presently have. 
Such a regulatory scheme might be modeled upon that which 
Congress has adopted in the Air Quality Control Act of 1967 .94 
Under that Act, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) develops air quality control criteria for the various atmo-
spheric regions into which the nation is divided.95 The states then 
promulgate air quality standards and enforcement measures which 
are evaluated by HEW to determine whether or not they are con-
sistent with the federal criteria. I£ the state standards are inadequate 
to protect the public health and safety, or if they are inconsistent 
with the federal standards, HEW may establish air quality control 
standards on its own initiative. The act specifically provides that the 
states may enact more exacting standards than the HEW criteria 
require.96 That regulatory scheme is predicated upon a congressional 
finding that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source 
is essentially a state responsibility;97 and the scheme provides a 
flexible approach for meeting the problem of such pollution and 
encourages local innovation and experimentation in developing con-
trol techniques.98 
Arguably, a similar approach could be utilized to control radio-
active air pollutants discharged from nuclear reactors. Those states 
which prefer to allocate their financial resources to the control of' 
other air pollutants and those states which are satisfied with the pro-
tection afforded by the AEC's standards could rely upon the AEC to 
provide minimum protection from radioactive air pollution. But 
those states wishing to provide an additional margin of safety would 
be free to do so by enacting safety standards more stringent than 
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-57(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
95. Atmospheric regions are air basins determined on the basis of meteorological 
studies, and may stretch across several states. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d)(l} (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968). 
96. It is possible to draw an inference of congressional intent to pre-empt state 
regulation of radiation hazards from the absence of a savings clause similar to this 
provision in the Air Quality Control Act. But the significance of the presence or 
absence of a savings clause depends upon the theory which one entertains with respect 
to federal pre-emption. One could argue that the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion creates a presumption of federal pre-emption and that consequently a savings 
clause would be necessary to negate this pre-emption. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that when the legislation deals with an area-such as that involving health 
and safety-in which the paramount policy appears to be the preservation of local 
authority, a savings clause is unnecessary to prevent pre-emption. More realistically, 
the presence or absence of a savings clause should not be determinative of the pre-
emption issue; rather the court should decide the matter in terms of the policies 
embodied within the legislature. See generally Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential 
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 211-14 (1959). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a}(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
98. See generally Martin & Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Control Act of 
1967, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 239 (1968). 
1314 Michigan Law Review 
those of the AEC. Under this approach, minimum protection for 
the entire country would still be provided by the AEC, yet the in-
creased role of state regulation and participation would provide a 
valuable safeguard against the possibility that the federal agency 
may be more interested in promotion than in regulation. Costs, 
whether in the form of increased product costs or of deterioration 
of the environment are incurred regardless of the approach taken; 
but the views of those persons who inevitably bear the burden of 
those costs deserve greater consideration than that which is now 
afforded to them in the present AEC regulatory scheme. 
